Everyone’s talking about the soldiers’ piece at the New York Times, “The War as We Saw It”. And rightfully so.

The result of a 15-month deployment, signed by six Army sergeants and a specialist, it’s one of those reminders that the military is generally not the problem. It often happens that a President bent on war finds a general to lead his military. Lincoln went through a lot of them, but most people thought he was looking for a competent aggressor. Bush and Cheney need someone to execute an impossible plan based on a bunch of hooey. Thankfully, many high-ranking officers have made it clear by word or deed that they feel there are some missions that should be not be undertaken. Now some sergeants are joining in.

One of the most impressive things about the article is the clarity of their vision of the situation.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

Straightforward and on the mark, as far as I can tell. Presumably these guys are not expecting to be career Army; or perhaps they haven’t heard about Gen. Taguba. But thank God for ’em.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

This article is undoubtedly part of what seems to be wide-spread displeasure in the military about the policy of arming all sides. Which we’re clearly doing, whether by disbanding the Iraqi army, losing 190,000 weapons, training Iraqis of dubious loyalty for police and military work, or directly handing guns to Sunnis hoping they’ll use them on “Al Qaeda in Iraq”. They might very well do so; but then what happens? Suppose we work with Sunnis to clear out the AQI folks, will the Shia-dominated government then be allowed to take control and the Sunnis required to give back the guns? Would they do that?

In any case, it’s good to know we have sergeants and specialists of such character and insight in the Army. It’s regrettable that their leadership, particularly their civilian leadership, has once again given them an impossible mission. Therein lies the truest similarity of the occupation of Iraq to the war in Vietnam. That, and the Presidential lies that led to each.

It’s regrettable, but understandable. Not acceptable or forgivable, from my point of view, but understandable as part of a pattern of behavior of the United States over time.

We don’t consciously seek to create violent crises; but our actions tend to create inequalities of financial and military power around the globe, which foster discontent. In particular, we’re by far the biggest seller of weapons, and we spend more on “defense” than the rest of the world combined. In theory, if the defense budget does anything other than transfer wealth from the general fund to the richest members of society, we should be able to take on the rest of the world at once; but in the real world we’ve lost to an insurgency.

For the Halliburtons and the Bechtels, the economy is in great shape. For the dead and wounded, and for those of us lucky enough to be on the sidelines, the inequalities look a lot like the Roaring ’20s, without the inventive and playful spirit. Of course, our war isn’t over yet. But I doubt we’ll have a decade between the end of our war and our economic reckoning.

We need wars and upheavals and rebellions to keep our economy going. And to assure our place as the most important country. If the question is, Who’s got the biggest stick, we’ll win. If it’s, Who’s got the best schools or medical care or industrial capability, we’ll be embarrassed.

Posted by Chuck Dupree at August 20, 2007 06:52 PM

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